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Alternative Models of Equal Protection Analysis: Plyler v. Doe' — The
power to control immigration is vested in the federal government. 2 Pursuant to
this power, Congress has enacted a complex legislative scheme which governs
admission to and status within the country's borders. 3 Nevertheless, a large
number of undocumented, and hence illegal, aliens enter the country each
year. 4 Efforts by the federal government to control illegal immigration have in-
versely corresponded to the United States' ability to absorb and profit from the
effective utilization of undocumented workers. 5 During periods of economic
growth, American employers have actively recruited Mexican labor;' in recent
years, however, the declining economy and rising demands on state and
federal government services have caused increasing public pressure in the
federal government to control illegal immigration.? The government, however,
has been accused of being either unwilling or unable to deal with problem.' In
light of the perceived federal abdication, several states have enacted legislation
aimed at minimizing the effects of the undocumented alien population on their
economies.'
In 1975 the Texas legislature amended Section 21.031 of the Texas Edu-
cation Code° to limit the availability of the state's education fund to citizens of
the United States and legally admitted aliens." Although the statute did not
forbid the local school districts to enroll illegal alien children, such children
would only be able to attend public schools if either their parents or the local
school districts were able and willing to absorb the costs ordinarily borne by the
' 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8.
See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 55 1101 et seq. (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
4 See Kane & Velardez-Munoz, Undocumented Aliens and the Constitution: Limitations on
State Action Denying Undocumented Children Access to Public Education, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 461,
461 (1978).
Id. at 468. See generally Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Immigration: In Search of a Just Im-
migration Law and Policy, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 615, 641-72 (1981) (historical account of federal
attempts to control Mexican immigration).
Lopez, supra note 5, at 641, 652, 669, Undocumented aliens are especially vulnerable
to exploitation and abuse because they are afraid to assert their legal rights. See Ortega, Plight of
the Mexican Wetback, 58 A.B.A. J. 251, 252-53 (1972). Thus many undocumented aliens work for
below the minimum wage and in unsafe working conditions. Id. at 252. See also Kane & Velardez-
Munoz, supra note 4, at 468.
7
 Kane & Velardez-Munoz, supra note 4, at 162,
8
 Brief for the Appellants at 5-6, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
g Kane & Velardez-Munoz, supra note 4, at 462. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE 5 2805
(West Supp. 1982) (prohibiting employment of illegal aliens); KAN, STAT. ANN. $ 21-4409
(1981) (same).
I° TEXAS EDUC. CODE ANN. 5 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
" The statute provides, in relevant part
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and
who are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first day of
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state." For the two years following the amendment of Section 21.031, the
Tyler Independent School District (ISD) continued to enroll illegal alien school
children free of charge. 13
 In July of 1977, however, the school board adopted a
policy requiring undocumented" children to pay a $1000 yearly tuition fee in
order to enroll. 15
 In response to the new policy, a group of undocumented
Mexican children who had been denied enrollment filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, challenging the constitu-
tionality of the statute as implemented by the Tyler ISD. 18 The plaintiffs
specifically alleged that their exclusion from the public schools deprived them
of the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment."
The district court, after certifying a class of all undocumented school
children of Mexican origin residing within the Tyler ISD,' 8 found the Texas
statute and the local school district policy implementing it unconstitutional."
The district court noted that although there were many factors suggesting that
a heightened level of scrutiny might be appropriate, there was no explicit
precedential ground for subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny." Nevertheless,
the court determined that because Texas had failed to demonstrate even a ra-
tional basis for the statute, it could not withstand even minimal scrutiny under
September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available
School Fund for that year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legal!), admitted
alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on thè first
day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be permitted to at-
tend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in which his parent,
guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies
for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit
into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either
citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not
over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his
parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district.
Id. (emphasis added).
12 Id. § 21.031(a). Texas' public schools are financed through a combination of federal,
state, and local funding. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S, 1, 72 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). For a detailed analysis of Texas' school financing system, see id. at
9-15; id. at 72-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 206 n.2 (1982).
14 The Tyler Independent School District policy which implemented the statute defined
legally admitted aliens as those with documentation sufficient to show their legal entry or
presence. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 206 n.2 (1982). Therefore, the term undocumented alien,
rather than illegal alien, will be used throughout this article.
" Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 571-72 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
16 Id. at 572.
" Id.
Id. at 571 n. 1.
" Id. at 593.
2° Id. at 585.
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the equal protection clause. 21 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, 22 and the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court."
In Plyler v. Doe, 24 the Supreme Court held that a state cannot deny to un-
documented alien children the free public education it provides to other
children residing within its borders, absent a showing that the denial furthers a
"substantial state interest. "25 Justice Brennan, writing for a five member ma-
jority, 26 determined that strict scrutiny was not the appropriate standard of
review because the statute did not disadvantage a suspect class or interfere with
the exercise of a fundamental right. 27 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan stated that
more than minimum rationality would be required to uphold the statute. 28 In
light of the significant costs to both the individual and to society when children
are denied a basic education, Justice Brennan concluded that the statute could
only be considered rational if it furthered a "substantial goal" of the state. 29
Finding that the state had failed to demonstrate that any sufficient state in-
terests were furthered by the statute, Justice Brennan held that the statute was
unconstitutional."
Three Justices filed concurring opinions. Justice Marshall filed a brief
concurrence asserting his belief that education was a fundamental right, and
repeating his criticism of the traditional two-tiered approach to equal protec-
tion analysis." Justice Blackmun concurred separately emphasizing the ab-
solute nature of the deprivation of education that was occasioned by the Texas
statute." Such a deprivation, Justice Blackmun claimed, placed children at a
"permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage."" He concluded
2 ' Id. The district court also held that the Texas statute was preempted by the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act. Id. at 592. The Court of Appeals reversed on the preemption issue,
concluding that there was no pre-emptive conflict between the Texas statute and the federal law.
Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court, in light of its disposition
of the case on equal protection grounds, declined to consider the preemption issue. Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 210 n.8 (1982).
22 Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 1980).
23 Probable jurisdiction noted in 451 U.S. 968 (1981). The case was consolidated on ap-
peal with In re Alien Children Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980) for briefing and
argument. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). Alien Children was a consolidation of
numerous suits filed in the United States District Courts for the Southern, Western, and North-
ern Districts of Texas, challenging the constitutionality of § 21.031 and various local policies im-
plementing it. In re Alien Children Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 550 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
24 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
21 Id. at 230.
26 Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and
Stevens. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell filed separate concurring opinions. Chief
Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor.
27 457 U.S. at 223.
26 Id. at 224.
29 Id.
3° Id. at 230.
31 Id. at 230 (Marshall, J., concurring).
32 Id. at 233-35 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
" Id. at 234.
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that the state must justify such a deprivation by showing more than mere ra-
tional basis. 34 Justice Powell, in his concurrence, emphasized the unique
nature of the plaintiff class." Drawing an analogy to cases involving illegiti-
mates, Justice Powell claimed that a heightened standard of review was appro-
priate in a case involving undocumented school children." Undocumented
children, he noted, like illegitimates, were not responsible for their legal
status. 37 Under such circumstances, he concluded, the Court appropriately re-
quired that the classification bear a substantial relation to substantial state in-
terests."
Chief Justice Burger, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices White,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor, criticized the majority for departing from tradi-
tional equal protection analysis." Although the Chief Justice agreed with the
majority that strict scrutiny was inappropriate, he asserted that the Court's
proper inquiry should therefore have been limited to determining whether the
statutory classification bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state pur-
pose." He reasoned that because undocumented aliens by definition have no
right to be in the country, it was therefore rational for the state to withhold
governmental benefits in order to conserve its limited resources for lawful
residents."
In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court held for the first time that un-
documented aliens were persons entitled to equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment. 42 Even more significant, however, was the analysis which
the Court employed in concluding that the Texas statute violated the equal
protection clause. The Plyler opinion indicates a strong shift away from a strict
two-tiered equal protection analysis and toward the use of a balancing ap-
proach much like the approach consistently advocated by Justice Marshall."
Nevertheless, the proliferation of opinions and rationales which the Plyler Court
produces indicates that the Court has not yet evolved a consistent and compre-
hensible equal protection doctrine.
This casenote begins by presenting an overview of equal protection doc-
trine at the time Plyler was decided." It traces the development of a two-tiered
approach to equal protection under the Warren Court, and the development of
intermediate scrutiny in recent years. Then, the majority, concurring and dis-
3+ Id. at 235.
" Id. at 236 (Powell, J., concurring).
36
 Id. at 238.
" Id.
38 Id. at 238-39.
39 Id. at 243 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
4° Id. at 248.
41 Id. at 250.
+2 Id. at 215. The Court had previously held that illegal aliens were protected under the
due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976).
" See infra notes 202-03, 314-22 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 49-205 and accompanying text.
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senting opinions in Plyler are presented. 45 It is asserted that the majority opin-
ion's analysis is best understood as a balancing of the competing interests of the
state and the individual. This casenote examines some of the balancing models
of equal protection analysis that have been proposed." It suggests a five-factor
balancing model as the most accurate description of the majority's analysis.
The rationales of the majority and concurring opinions are analyzed in light of
the proposed balancing model. 47 Finally, the merits of a balancing approach
are discussed."
I. EQUAL PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 49 is today a
significant tool of constitutional adjudication. This has not always been the
case. Prior to the "egalitarian revolution" of the Warren Court, 50 judicial in-
tervention under the equal protection clause was limited to cases involving
racial discrimination. 5 ' The evolution of the equal protection clause from what
was once considered the "usual last resort" of constitutional argument" into
what many regard as a primary tool for effecting social change has sparked con-
troversy, criticism, and confusion among both legal commentators and the
members of an often divided Supreme Court.
A review of the historical development of the two-tiered model of equal
protection analysis and the more recent trend toward a multi-tiered approach is
crucial to understanding the issues presented in Plyler u. Doe and the impor-
tance of the Court's treatment of those issues. This section begins by present-
ing the Court's early equal protection cases and the development of the rational
basis standard of review. It then examines the development of the two-tiered
model of equal protection under the Warren Court, Finally it analyzes the
birth and development of an intermediate standard of review as the favored ap-
proach to equal protection cases.
A. Early Equal Protection and the Rational Basis Standard
The fourteenth amendment was adopted in 18613 primarily to insure that
the Reconstruction measures enacted by Congress after the Civil War would
4 ' See infra notes 205-286 and accompanying text.
+6 See infra notes 308-22 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 326-334 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 335-42 and accompanying text.
* 5 Section one of the fourteenth amendment provides:
No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5° Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term — Forward: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title
to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 144 (1964).
" Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term — Forward; In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV, L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
" Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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not be found to be beyond the scope of congressional power. 53 Although it was
drafted in broad language that went beyond merely prohibiting racial
discrimination," early decisions by the Supreme Court interpreted the equal
protection clause narrowly. The first Supreme Court opinion interpreting the
clause predicted that it would never be applied in a situation not involving
discrimination against blacks. 55 By 1886, however, this limited interpretation
had been rejected and the equal protection clause had been deemed to apply
more broadly. 56
Regardless of its breadth, the equal protection clause did not impose
demanding obligations on the states. The Supreme Court , required that a state
rest its legislative classifications upon differences that were reasonably related
to the purpose of the statute." in applying this reasonableness or rationality re-
quirement, the Court gave considerable deference to the legislative judgment.
It did not inquire whether the legislative decision was accurate, provided it was
not arbitrary. 58 In the extreme, if any set of facts could reasonably be conceived
to provide a rational basis for the classification, the Court would uphold the
statute. 59 Thus, in Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Commissioners, 60 the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a statute which gave harbor pilots complete discretion in
the selection of their apprentices. 8 ' Because completion of an apprenticeship
was a statutory prerequisite to obtaining a pilot license, the harbor pilots were
able to restrict jobs to their relatives and friends." Although the Court
recognized that nepotism in the civil service could pose problems, it concluded
that the legislature "might" have intended the statute to foster morale and an
esprit de corps among river pilots."
" Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term — Forward: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARv, L. REV. 1, 14 (1977). A constitutional amendment was thought necessary
to overturn the assumptions of racial inferiority and restrictive citizenship that were embodied in
the Supreme Court's infamous Dred Scott decision of 1856. Id. For a discussion of the history
behind the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, see Frank & Munro, The Original Understand-
ing of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 133-42 (1950); Bickel, The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-65 (1955).
54 See supra note 49.
" The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
56 See, e.g. , Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (Asians entitled to equal
protection); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (equal protec-
tion clause applies to corporations).
" Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897). See also Tussman and ten-
Brock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344-53 (1949).
58 See, e.g., Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251, 263 (1936).
59 Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959); Lindsley v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). Judicial deference has been said to have operated
regardless of whether the conceivable state of facts actually existed, would justify the classification
if it did exist, or had ever been urged in the classification's defense. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 16-3 (1978).
6° 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
" Id. at 564.
62 Id. at 555.
65 Id. at 563.
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The Supreme Court continues to employ the deferential "rational basis"
standard of review to most social and economic regulations." Although the
Court has articulated a number of tests which it applies to statutes in order to
determine whether legislative classifications have a rational basis, it generally
requires that the challenged classification bear a "rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose. " 65
 Ordinarily, the state need only assert a plausible
purpose, regardless of whether it reflects the legislature's actual intent. 66 Con-
sequently, the rational basis standard operates as a presumption of the
challenged legislation's constitutionality." As one commentator has noted, the
presumption is so strong that judicial scrutiny of legislative classifications
under the rational basis test is minimal in theory and virtually nonexistent in
fact."
B. Strict Scrutiny: A Two-Tiered Model of Equal Protection
Judicial deference to legislative classifications is founded in part on a
recognition of the imperfections of the legislative process," and in part, on fun-
damental notions of the role of the federal courts in our system of
government. 70
 Nevertheless, the Court has not always deferred to legislative
choices. Instead, as Professor Lawrence Tribe has noted, the Court has
recognized that some political choices must be subject to close analysis in order
to preserve substantive values of equality and liberty." This recognition was
first evidenced by invalidation of statutes discriminating on their face against
blacks and other racial minorities. 72
 The expansion of heightened equal protec-
" See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175-79 (1980)
(rational basis standard employed in review of Railroad Retirement Act); New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-06 (1976) (regulation of push-cart vendors); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970) (welfare legislation).
" See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). But
see Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 374 (1974) ("A classification ... must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.") (em-
phasis added).
66
 United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) ("It is ...
constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision... .")
(quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)).
" McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
68 Gunther, supra note 51, at 8.
69
 Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("[T]he reform may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind."); Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69 (1913) ("The problems
of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommoda-
tions '').
7° See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting Co. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) ("[W]e do
not sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy
which it expresses offends the public welfare."). See also Barrett, The Rational Basis Standard for
Equal Protection Review of Ordinary Legislative Classifications, 68 KY. L.J. 845, 872-75 (1980).
71 L. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1000.
" See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943) ("Distinctions be-
tween citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
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tion scrutiny to other types of legislative classifications was heralded in United
States v. Carotene Products Co." In Carotene Products the Court rejected an equal
protection challenge to the Filled Milk Act of 1923, concluding that the legisla-
tion was rational'* Nevertheless, Justice Stone observed in a footnote that cer-
tain legislative choices — those directed at particular minorities or interfering
with certain rights — might call for more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
fourteenth amendment."
As early as 1944, in Korematsu v. United States," the Court noted that racial
classifications are "suspect" and therefore subject to "rigid scrutiny. '" 77 It was
not until the Warren Court era, however, that Justice Stone's now famous
footnote in Carotene Products provided a framework for active judicial review of
certain legislative classifications.
Under the Warren Court, statutes which burdened fundamental rights 78
or which classified on the basis of "suspect" .criteria" came to trigger a more
stringent standard of review, or "strict scrutiny." Under the strict scrutiny
standard, the Court requires that the state show that the statutory scheme is
"necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. " 80 Moreover, when
reviewing legislation which affects fundamental rights, the Court requires that
the state have chosen the "less drastic means" of achieving the statute's objec-
tives. 8 '
The strict scrutiny standard is an exacting one. As the rational basis
standard operates as a presumption of constitutionality, 82 the application of the
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."). See also Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880).
" 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
74 Id. at 152-54.
" Id. at 152 n.4. Justice Stone's oft-cited footnote stated that:
[L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be ex-
pected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation [may] be subject to more ex-
acting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment than are most other types of legislation....
ISlimilar considerations may enter into the review of statutes directed at par-
ticular religious, or national, or racial minorities: ... prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry.
Id. (citations omitted).
" 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
" Id. at 216.
" See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (criminal appeals).
79 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971) (alienage); Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (national origin); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944) (race).
" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis supplied by the court).
81 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
84
 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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strict scrutiny test, conversely, almost guarantees that the statute will be struck
down. 83
 Consequently, whether a statute can survive an equal protection
challenge depends almost entirely upon whether it is subject to strict scrutiny or
minimum rationality analysis. This question in turn depends on whether a
suspect class or fundamental right is implicated. As a result, the focus of equal
protection analysis has been on the question of what rights should be con-
sidered "fundamental" and what classes should be considered "suspect."
1. Fundamental Rights
A classification which restricts or penalizes the exercise of a fundamental
right violates the equal protection clause, unless it is necessary to promote a
compelling state interest." In Shapiro v. Thompson," the Warren Court made its
earliest statement of the fundamental rights strand of equal protection strict
scrutiny. 86 In Shapiro, the plaintiffs had challenged state and federal regulations
which imposed a one year residency requirement on applicants for welfare
assistance." The Court held that the residency requirement infringed on the
applicant's constitutionally protected right to travel and, unless shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling state interest, was unconstitutional."
Although the Shapiro opinion emphasized that the freedom to travel from
state to state had long been recognized as a constitutionally protected right,"
the opinion suggested to Justice Harlan that strict scrutiny would be applied to
any interest or right which the Court considered important or fundamenta1. 9°
The rights actually identified by the Warren Court as fundamental — voting, 9 '
criminal appeals, 92
 and interstate travel" — were few. Nonetheless, the broad
language of many of the Court's opinions led commentators to speculate that
the fundamental rights doctrine might encompass such things as welfare bene-
fits, zoning, municipal services, and education." Recent decisions of the
83
 Gunther, supra note 51, at 8. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219
(1944) (military order excluding Japanese Americans from certain areas of the West Coast
upheld under strict scrutiny).
" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
as Id.
" L. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1003.
87 394 U.S. at 621-22.
" Id. at 634.
09 Id. at 629.
'° Justice Harlan, dissenting in Shapiro, expressed concern that the Court had created
an exception which threatened to swallow the rule, 394 U.S. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting), and
stated that "I know of nothing which entitles this Court to pick out particular human activities,
characterize them as 'fundamental,' and give them added protection under an unusually strin-
gent equal protection test." Id. at 662.
91
 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
92
 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1969) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
judgment).
93
 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
4 Gunther, supra note 51, at 9. See also Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term — For-
ward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
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Burger Court, however, have shown such speculations to have been prema-
ture. In Dandridge v. Williams, 95 the Court employed the rational basis standard
in evaluating an equal protection challenge to a state statute which imposed a
ceiling on welfare benefits." Although the Court recognized that the case con-
cerned the "most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," it
concluded that the classification was in the area of social and economic regula-
tion and thus there was no basis for the application of a strict standard." The
Court thus upheld the ceiling on welfare benefits as a rational means to further
the state's interest in encouraging employment."
The implication in Dandridge that the Burger Court would construe the
fundamental rights aspect of strict scrutiny narrowly was confirmed in San An-
tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez . 99 In that case, the Court held that for
purposes of equal protection, fundamental rights are those rights explicitly or
implicitly protected by the Constitution.'°° In Rodriguez, the Court sustained a
state's public school financing scheme which relied in part on local property
taxes.'°' The scheme resulted in significant disparities in per-pupil expendi-
tures between property-poor and property-rich school districts. 102 Finding that
education was neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,
the Court determined that the appropriate standard of review was the rational
basis test. 1 °3 The court concluded that the school financing scheme was rational
and therefore constitutional.'"
Although the Court in Rodriguez did not offer guidelines as to when a right
would be deemed implicitly protected by the Constitution, it has yet to expand
the concept of fundamental rights beyond those rights which had been iden-
tified as fundamental prior to Rodriguez. Despite Justice Harlan's concerns,'°5
fundamental rights analysis has not been transformed into a tool for wide-
ranging and perhaps arbitrary invalidation of governmental action. Rather,
the list of fundamental rights remains in fact quite limited; government action
is invalidated as infringing on fundamental rights only when, without com-
pelling justification, it infringes on an individual's right to vote, to obtain a
criminal appeal, or to travel.
" 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
98 Id. at 486-87.
97 Id. at 485.
98 Id. at 486-87.
99 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
'" Id. at 33-34.
101 Id. at 4-6.
102 Id. at 15.
103 Id. at 40. The Court left open, however, the question of whether an absolute depriva-
tion of educational benefits, as opposed to the relative deprivation presented in Rodriguez, would
trigger heightenend scrutiny. Id. at 25 n.60 & 36-37.
104 Id. at 55.
1 °' See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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2. Suspect Classifications
The second strand of equal protection analysis which has evoked strict
judicial scrutiny has focused on the nature of the class affected. The Court has
struck down legislation which draws lines on the basis of membership in certain
suspect classes, unless the state has shown that the statute furthers a compelling
state interest. Implicit in the idea that particular classifications are suspect is a
recognition by the Court that certain "discrete and insular minorities" may
need judicial protection from the adverse affects of a majoritarian political
system.i°6 Under the Warren Court, the suspect class aspect of equal protec-
tion strict scrutiny, like the fundamental rights doctrine, had the potential for
considerable expansion. '°' The Court drew heavily on Justice Stone's language
in Carotene Products, labeling as "discrete and insular minorities," and therefore
suspect classes, groups defined on the basis of race,'°" alienage,'" and national
origin."° The mere labeling a class as a "discrete and insular minority,"
however, contributes little to an understanding of which classes will be ac-
corded extra judicial protection; such a description could apply to almost any
identifiable group which is on the losing side in the political process."' Never-
theless, the Warren Court in particular appeared to favor an expansive ap-
plication of the doctrine, and statements in several opinions ied many to believe
that the poor would be deemed a suspect class, thus finding heightened protec-
tion under the equal protection clause."'
Just as the Burger Cairn has significantly limited the scope of the fun-
damental rights doctrine, however, it has similarly defined and limited the con-
cept of suspect classes. The Court has identified several additional indicia of
suspectness which it has used primarily to explain why certain classes are not
accorded suspect status.'" In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, " 4
in addition to determining that education is not a fundamental right,'" the
Court held that the state school financing scheme which was based in part on
106 See supra note 75.
1 ° 7 Gunther, supra note 51, at 9-10.
1 ° 8
 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944).
109 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
"° Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 656-57 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("Our society, consisting of over 200 million individuals of multitudinous origins, customs,
tongues, beliefs, and cultures is, to say the least, diverse. It would hardly take extraordinary in-
genuity for a lawyer to find 'insular and discrete' minorities at every turn in the road.").
112 Gunther, supra note 51, at 9-10. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comin'rs,
394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) ("A careful examination on our part is especially warranted where
lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, ... two factors which would independently render
a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny.").
" 9 See infra notes 116-122 and accompanying text.
114 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
'" See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
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local property taxes did not discriminate against a suspect class.'" The Court
reasoned that the plaintiff class, composed of residents of poorer tax districts,
was not "saddled with such disabilities, or subject to such a history of purpose-
ful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from a majoritarian political
process. " 17 Similarly, in Mathews v. Lucas,' the Court upheld a Social Securi-
ty Act provision which gave legitimate children seeking insurance benefits cer-
tain procedural advantages that were denied to illegitimate children ." 9 Finding
that illegitimates were not a suspect class, the Court noted that "illegitimacy
does not carry an obvious badge, as race and sex do" and that "discrimination
against illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the
historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes. 7)120
Other factors the Court has identified as relevant to determining whether a
class is suspect include whether the class has been subject to a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment based on stereotyped characteristics not truly in-
dicative of ability,"' and whether the class suffers from an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth.' 22
Despite the delineation by the Burger Court of this set of criteria for iden-
tifying suspectness, the Court has not applied these criteria consistently.' 23 In
Frontiero v. Richardson, t24 for instance, a plurality of the Court identified a class
based on gender as inherently suspect. 123 Nonetheless, later decisions have not
subjected gender based classifications to strict scrutiny.' 26 Apparently, it is un-
likely that the Burger Court will expand the categories of either interests con-
sidered fundamental or classes considered suspect.'" In spite of, or perhaps
because of this reluctance to increase the scope of strict scrutiny, the two-tiered
analysis has proven itself unable to deal adequately with the range of interests
potentially implicated by the equal protection clause. Consequently, the Court
has, at times explicitly, but often implicitly, attempted to devise new ways of
dealing with these interests.
"6 411 U.S. at 28.
117 Id.
" 6 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
"6 Id. at 516.
120 Id. at 506.
121 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (age not a
suspect criterion).
122 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
123 Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitu-
tional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 978 (1975).
126 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
125 Id. at 688.
126 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1981); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
127 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1976) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) ("[The Court] has apparently lost interest in recognizing further 'fun-
damental' rights and 'suspect' classes.").
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C. The Development of an Intermediate Standard of Review
Theoretically, the two tiered model of equal protection analysis involves
two analytical processes. The Court first determines the appropriate standard
of review by examining the nature of the right and class affected. It then applies
that standard to the particular classification and statute in question. In practice
however, the first step, the selection of the standard of review, is likely to deter-
mine the outcome of the case. The designation of a class as suspect, or a right
as fundamental, is regarded as tantamount to invalidation of the statutory
classification.'" Similarly, if the rational basis standard is employed, the
challenged legislation is generally upheld.'" Although one previously noted
result of this sharp dichotomy between the two standards of review has been
reluctance on the part of the Burger Court to declare additional fundamental
rights or suspect classes,' 30 another has been widespread dissatisfaction with
the two-tiered approach to equal protection analysis g -enerally. 13 ' Thus, in a
growing range of cases, the Court has invoked an intermediate level of
scrutiny, somewhere between the innocuous rational basis test and the general-
ly fatal strict scrutiny test.'" Selection of an intermediate standard of review,
as opposed to the rational basis or strict scrutiny standards, does not determine
the outcome of the case. Rather, the Court focuses on the second aspect of
equal protection analysis, the application of the standard to the facts of the
case.
The Court has expressly extended an intermediate level of scrutiny to
some legislative classifications, such as those based on gender' 33 or illegitima-
cy. 134 In other cases, however, the Court has applied an intermediate type of
analysis while its express rationale has adhered to the traditional two-tiered
model of analysis. For example, in Reed v. Reed,' 35 the Court addressed a chal-
lenge to a state statute which gave mandatory preference to males over females
in the appointment of intestate administrators.' 36 Although the Court osten-
sibly applied the rational basis standard of review, it noted that legislative
classifications "must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation .... "'" The Court concluded -
that the difference in the sex of the applicants was not sufficiently related to the
"ll Id. at 119.
129 Id.
' 3° See supra notes 99-104, 123-127 and accompanying text.
13 ' See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 51, at 17-18; Wilkinson, supra note 123, at 946. Perhaps
the most outspoken critic of the two-tiered formulation has been Justice Marshall. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-20 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132 L. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1082.
133 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
134 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 762-67 (1977).
135 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
136 Id. at 72-73.
'" Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
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state's interest in reducing the workload of its probate courts to be consistent
with the equal protection clause.' 38 Similarly, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,' 39 the
Court struck down a provision of the Social Security Act which awarded sur-
vivor's benefits to widows, but not to widowers, who were responsible for de-
pendent children."° In Wiesenfeld, the Court again purported to review the stat-
ute under the rational basis standard.'" Rather than uphold the statute on any
grounds that would make it rational, however, the Court looked to the legisla-
ture's actual purpose. 142 The Court rejected the state's asserted purpose "to
compensate women beneficiaries as a group for the economic difficulties which
still confront women who seek to support themselves and their families" 143 and
instead determined that the actual statutory purpose was to enable the surviv-
ing parent to remain at home to care for the child.'" The Court concluded that
for the purposes of childcare, a distinction between widows and widowers was
irrational, and therefore unconstitutional."'
In 1976, in Craig v. Boren,'" Justice Powell expressly acknowledged that
classifications based on gender evoke a standard of review more sharply focused
than the normally deferential rational basis standard, but less demanding than
the strict scrutiny standard.'" In Craig, the Court struck down a statute which
prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 years of age and to females
under 18. 148 The Court noted that classifications based on gender generally are
the product of "archaic and overbroad generalizations" about the proper roles
of men and women. 149 To withstand the constitutional challenge, the Court
held, such classifications must serve "important governmental objectives" and
be "substantially related" to those objectives. ' 5 ° Although it found the state's
interest in public health and safety to be important, the Court concluded that
the statistics presented by the state, which showed a slightly higher percentage
of 18-21 year old males were arrested for drunk driving than females in the
same age group, provided an "unduly tenuous fit" to justify the classifica-
tion. 151 Because the classification was not substantially related to the State's objec-
tive, therefore, the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional.'"
1 " Id. at 76-77.
139 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
' 4° Id. at 637-39.
"' Id. at 648.
142 Id. & n.16.
143 Id. at 648.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 653. Compare the Court's treatment of statutory purposes in Kotch v. Board of
River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 532 (1947), discussed supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
'" 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
147 Id. at 210-11 n.* (Powell, J., concurring),
' 4° Id. at 210.
143 Id. at 198.
' 5° Id. at 197.
15 ' Id. at 201-02.
In Id. at 204.
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In addition to classifications based on gender, the Court has expressly ap-
plied an intermediate standard of review to classifications disadvantaging ille-
gitimates.'" Although illegitimates are not a suspect class,'" the Court has
noted that classifications based on illegitimacy rest on the individual's status of
birth, and punish the individual for the misdeeds of the parents.' 55 Thus, in
Trimble v. Gordon, 156 the Court struck down an Illinois statute which allowed il-
legitimate children to inherit from their fathers by intestate succession only if
the child had been legitimated by the intermarriage of the parents.'" The
plaintiff was an illegitimate child who had not been acknowledged and whose
parents had never married, but whose father's paternity had been determined
in a judicial decree ordering support payments.'" The Court noted that the
state had a strong interest in safeguarding the orderly disposition of property,
and that the problems of proving paternity of illegitimate children might justify
the imposition of more demanding requirements on such children claiming
under their fathers' estates. 159 Nevertheless, because the statute required the
marriage of the parents and thereby excluded a large number of children who
might otherwise have been able to present a claim without jeopardizing the
orderly settlement of an estate,'" the Court concluded that the limitation was
not "carefully tuned to alternative considerations" and was therefore unconsti-
tutional.' 61
Addressing a similar statute in Lalli v. Lalli,' 62 the Court again applied an
intermediate level of scrutiny. In Lalli, however, the Court upheld a statute
which required that the paternity of the father have been determined in a
judicial proceeding prior to the father's death, in order for illegitimate children
to claim under his estate.' 63 The Court noted that although the statute would
exclude some children who might otherwise have been able to claimwithout
seriously disrupting the settlement of estates, unlike the statute in Trimble, it
did not totally disinherit illegitimate children who had not been legitimized.'"
The Court, therefore, concluded that the statute was substantially related to
the state's interest in the orderly administration of estates. 165
As Trimble and Lalli illustrate, the intermediate standard of review is a
more flexible tool than strict scrutiny. The designation of a particular class as
' 53 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767
(1977).
154 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976).
155 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972).
156 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
I" Id. at 763 & 776.
1 " Id. at 763-64.
159 Id. at 770-71.
' 60 Id.
' 61 Id.
' 62 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
I" Id. at 261, 275-76.
164 Id. at 272-73. The Court noted that the plaintiffs in Trimble would not have been
barred under the statute upheld in Lalli. Id. at 276.
163 Id. at 275-76.
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one entitled to an intermediate standard of review, as opposed to strict scrutiny
does not leave "ungoverned and ungovernable" an entire legislative area.' 66
The intermediate standard of review has thus enabled the Court to deal with
classifications such as alienage, which may be appropriate for some legislative
purposes but not for others. The Court has held that aliens are a "prime exam-
ple of a 'discrete and insular' minority" and thus are a suspect class.' 67
 More
recently, however, the Court has retreated from that holding and instead has
applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to most alienage classifications. 168 The
Court has stated, that to require all state statutes classifying on the basis of
alienage to meet the standards of strict scrutiny would be to "obliterate all the
distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values
of citizenship.' 169
 The treatment of aliens as a class clearly does not fit well
with either strict scrutiny or minimum rationality analysis. Under the former,
aliens would become de facto citizens and under the latter they might well be
subject to arbitrary government action based solely on their status as aliens.
The impetus for a middle ground is clear.
In Sugarman v. Douga11, 170
 the Court invalidated a statutory prohibition
against the employment of aliens in the state civil service."' The Court stated
that, in analyzing a classification based on alienage, it would examine the
substantiality of the state's interest, and the narrowness of the limits within
which the discrimination was contained.' 72 Although the Court recognized the
important state interest in having loyal employees, it concluded that the statute
was "neither narrowly confined nor precise in its application" and did not
withstand "close judicial scrutiny.'"" The Court noted, however, that for an
appropriately defined class of positions, the state could validly make citizenship
a qualification for employment. 174
 A citizenship qualification, the Court sug-
gested, would be appropriate for elective and non-elective governmental offices
and for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, and re-
view of broad public policy, since these functions go to the heart of representa-
"6
 Gunther, supra note 51, at 23 (analogizing to Justice Jackson's rationale for prefer-
ring equal protection over substantive due process as grounds for invalidating statutes in Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
'" Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). In Graham, the Court struck down
state statutes which excluded some aliens from certain state funded welfare programs. Id. at 376.
The states' interests in preserving limited benefits for their own citizens, the Court concluded,
was not a compelling justification for discrimination against aliens and therefore the statutes were
unconstitutional. Id.
168 See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 642-43 (1973). Cf. Amback v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73-74 (1979) (rational basis
standard).
169
 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978) (quoting Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S.
I, 14 (1977) (Burger, C. J., dissenting)).
' 7°
 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
17 ' Id. at 646.
172 Id. at 642.
'" Id. at 642-43.
174 Id. at 647.
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tive government. "5 For other types of positions, the preclusion of aliens was
unconstitutional. Relying on the "Sugarman exception" the Court has since up-
held state statutes barring aliens from such positions as public school
teacher, 175 and police officer)" In other areas, the Court has continued to ap-
ply heightened, if not strict, scrutiny to state statutes that discriminate on the
basis of alienage) 78
Despite the growing body of precedent employing an intermediate stand-
ard of review, the Court has applied that standard erratically. The Court has
not articulated a principled theory of when such scrutiny will be considered ap-
propriate. Professor Tribe has suggested that intermediate level scrutiny is trig-
gered when important, though not fundamental, rights are at stake, or when
sensitive, though not suspect, classifications are employed. 179 The Court how-
ever, frequently reverts to a rigid two-tiered analysis when intermediate
scrutiny appears more appropriate.' 8° For example, in Massachusetts Board of Re-
tirement v. Murgia, 181 the Court upheld a statute which mandated retirement at
1 " Id.
"6 Amback v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 74-76 (1979) (public school teachers perform a
task that "goes to the heart of representative government.").
177
 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297-300 (1978) ("police function is ... one of the
basic functions of government").
178 See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1977) (statute excluding aliens from
educational benefits); Examining Bd. of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-02
(1976) (statute preventing aliens from practicing as licensed engineers); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 721-22 (1973) (statute excluding aliens from practice of law).
As a result of the problematic status of aliens under the equal protection clause, many
commentators have argued that preemption principles provide a more uniform framework for the
analysis of alienage classifications. See, e.g., Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1063-64 (1979); Note, State Burdens on Resident Aliens: A New
Preemption Analysis, 89 YALE L. J. 940, 940-47 (1980). The Supreme Court recently used this ap-
proach to avoid reaching equal protection issues in Toll v. Moreno, 102 S. Ct. 2977, 2982
(1982). Toll involved both equal protection and preemption challenges to a state regulation which
denied to non-immigrant aliens reduced "in-state" tuition at state universities. Id. at 2979. The
Court concluded that the regulation was preempted by federal immigration law and thus did not
reach the equal protection claim. Id. at 2982.
A similar approach has been urged for regulations affecting undocumented aliens. Note,
supra, at 953. See also Note, Right of Illegal-Alien Children to State-Provided Education: Plyler v, Doe, 96
HARV. L. REV. 130 (1982) (asserting that the Court in Plyler should have undertaken a preemp-
tion analysis to avoid the equal protection claim). A finding that a state statute is preempted
allows the Court to avoid reaching an equal protection claim and thus the need to apply ap-
parently different standards to state and federal alienage classifications. A finding that a statute is
not preempted, however, is not dispositive of the state's authority to employ the classification. As
the Court noted in Graham, Congress cannot authorize a state to violate the . equal protection
clause. 403 U.S, 365, 382 (1971).
"5
 See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1089-90. Note that gender, alienage, and il-
legitimacy all possess some, though not all, of the attributes that the Court has used to identify a
suspect class.
188 See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977) (upholding under rational basis
test state regulations limiting state funding to medically necessary abortions); Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (mandatory retirement age); San Antonio v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (school financing scheme based on local property taxes).
181 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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age fifty for state police officers. 182 The Court determined that the statute did
not impinge on a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class and,
therefore, strict scrutiny was not appropriate.'" The Court concluded that the
classification was rationally related to the state's purpose of insuring the fitness
of its police force and therefore constitutional. 184 Although the statute impinged
on employment, which, though not a fundamental right, is arguably impor-
tant, 185 and although it classified on the basis of age, which has at least some of
the characteristics of a suspect class, the Court did not consider the possibility
of employing an intermediate level of review.
Many commentators, attempting to understand and reconcile the Court's
equal protection decisions, have suggested models for intermediate scrutiny.'"
Professor Gerald Gunther, one of the earliest commentators to recognize the
Court's apparent departure from the traditional approach to equal protection,
proposed a model for intermediate level scrutiny which involved a relatively
narrow, means-focused scrutiny of legislative classifications.'" Under Gun-
ther's model, the Court would require that the means chosen by the legislature
substantially further the legislature's articulated purpose.'" The Court would
measure the means in relation to the legislative objective asserted by the gov-
ernment in support of the classification, rather than resort to hypothetical pur-
poses conceived by the Court of its own volition. "9 Moreover, the Court would
not weigh the importance of the state's interest, permitting the state to achieve
a range of objectives."°
In many of the equal protection cases decided since Professor Gunther's
article, however, the Court has clearly gone beyond the limited means-focused
inquiry envisioned by the proposed model. The Court has analyzed. statutory
ends as well as means, requiring that the State's interest be substantial. 191 Sim-
ple concern for administrative convenience or judicial economy, for example,
has been held to be insufficient justification for classifications based on gender
182 Id. at 310.
183 Id. at 312-13.
' 9' Id. at 314.
185 Id. at 322 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The right to work is "of the very essence of the
persona] freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth Amendment] to
secure. „ . " Id. at 317 (quoting Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1913)).
I86 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 51, at 20-24; Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review
Under the Equal Protection Guarantee—Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L. J.
1071, 1079-94 (1974); Wilkinson, supra note 123, at 984-88.
187 Gunther, supra note 51, at 20.
188 Id. at 20-21. For the classic discussion of the relationship between statutory means
and ends under the equal protection clause, see Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 57, at 343-53.
See also Note, Equal Protection: A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 76 MICH. L. REV. 771, 813-21 (1978).
189 Gunther, supra note 51, at 21. This standard is considerably less vigorous than the
strict scrutiny standard, which requires that the means be necessary and the least drastic alternative.
See, e.g. , Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 637 (1969). See also supra notes 85-88 and ac-
companying text.
190
 Gunther, supra note 51, at 21.
191 Nowak, supra note 186, at 1071-72.
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and illegitimacy. 192 The Court's approach is not easily characterized in terms
of a single identifiable test. Professor Tribe has identified five techniques of in-
termediate review that the Court has employed:'" assessing the importance of
the state's objectives;' 94 demanding close fit between legislative means and
ends;'" requiring current articulation of the statutory purpose;' 96 limiting
afterthought justifications;' 97 and permitting rebuttal.' 98
Increasingly, in an attempt to formulate uniform principles of equal pro-
tection review, commentators have discussed the Court's analysis in terms of a
balancing of the competing individual and governmental interests.'" Professor
J. Harvie Wilkinson, for example, has proposed a balancing approach to inter-
mediate level review of statutes which deny "equality of opportunity" to par-
ticular groups.'" Under Professor Wilkinson's model, the Court would weigh
and balance the following elements: "(1) the importance of the opportunity be-
ing unequally burdened or denied; (2) the strength of the state interest served
in denying it; and (3) the character of the groups whose opportunities are
denied. " 201 As such, Wilkinson's approach is virtually the same as the balanc-
ing approach that Justice Marshall has consistently advocated. 202 Marshall,
however, asserts that the Court, despite its outward adherence to the two-
tiered model of equal protection analysis, has and does apply a balancing test
in all equal protection cases. 203
192 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); supra notes !35-138 and accompanying
text.
199 L. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1082.
j9+ See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (state's objective of insufficient
importance to sustain use of gender criterion in the appointment of intestate administrator).
199 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201-02 (1976) (statistics showing that a slight-
ly higher percentage of males than females were arrested for drunk driving provided unduly
tenuous fit to justify gender based classification).
196 According to Professor Tribe, this technique involves refusing to hypothesize a ra-
tionale for a statute when the rationale is not argued by the government in support of the statute.
L. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 1083-85.
'" See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) (rejecting state's con-
tention that statute which limited survivor's benefits to widows was designed to compensate
women for economic difficulties unique to them).
"11
 Professor Tribe asserts that this technique requires that a legal scheme be altered to
permit rebuttal in individual cases even if the scheme is not struck down altogether. L. TRIBE,
supra note 59, at 1088. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father must be
allowed to prove his fitness as a parent in a custody proceeding).
199
 Wilkinson, supra note 123, at 984-98; Note, supra note 188, at 869-88.
25° Wilkinson, supra note 123, at 989. Professor Wilkinson identifies three areas of
equality in which equal protection issues arise: equality in political participation, equality of com-
petitive opportunity, and economic equality. Id. at 955. Under his proposed model, classifica-
tions which result in political inequalities are subject to the strictest review, while classifications
bearing on economic inequality are subject to deferential review. Id. at 946.
20 ' Id. at 991.
202 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting),
203 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall,
3., dissenting). "[The Court] has focused upon the character of the classification in question, the
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Despite the consistent advocacy of justice Marshall and other commenta-
tors, a majority of the Court has never expressly embraced a balancing theory
of equal protection analysis. Generally, the Court has continued to articulate
the traditional two-tiered theory, although the Court's application of its own
standards is erratic. 2" The result has been what one commentator has called
an accumulation of ad hoc doctrines flexible enough to accommodate a
cautious Court's preferences for mildly progressive results. " 2 D 5 It was against
this background that the Supreme Court decided Plyler v. Doe.
II. PLYLER V. DOE
In Plyler e. Doe, 206 the Supreme Court held that a state statute which al-
lowed schools to deny a tuition free education to undocumented children did
not further a substantial interest of the state and therefore, was invalid under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'" This section of the
casenote examines the Court's analysis of the equal protection claim. In partic-
ular, it studies the Court's approach to selecting an appropriate standard of re-
view. It then examines the Court's application of the standard to the facts of
the case. Finally, this section presents the reasoning of the concurring and dis-
senting opinions.
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Brennan, writing for a five member majority, began his analysis in
Plyler by considering the state's contention that undocumented aliens were not
"persons" within the meaning of the equal protection clause. 208 Prior to Plyler,
the Supreme Court had never addressed whether the equal protection clause
was applicable to undocumented aliens. First, Justice Brennan noted that un-
documented aliens had been held to be "persons" guaranteed due process by
the fifth and fourteenth amendments:208
 He then addressed the appellants'
contention that the words "within its jurisdiction" limit the scope of the equal
protection clause to persons legally within the United States. 210 Justice Bren-
nan asserted that neither the relevant precedent, the purposes of the equal pro-
tection clause, nor the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, sup-
ported such an interpretation. 2 " Moreover, he noted that undocumented
aliens were subject to the full range of obligations imposed by the state's civil
relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits
they do not receive, and the state interest asserted in support of the classification." Id.
"4 Wilkinson, supra note 123, at 951.
7°' Id. at 953-54.
206
 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
207 Id. at 230.
2° 8 Id. at 210.
"9 Id.
2 " Id. at 210-16.
7 " Id. at 211-13. Justice Brennan noted that the Court had consistently emphasized the
territorial meaning of the language of the fourteenth amendment. Id. & n.12.
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and criminal laws as long as they remained within the state's borders. 212
 Justice
Brennan concluded, therefore, that undocumented aliens were "persons with-
in the jurisdiction" of the state, and, therefore, were entitled to the equal pro-
tection of the laws. 2 ' 3
Justice Brennan then examined whether the Texas statute violated the
equal protection clause. 214 He identified three possible standards under which
the statute could be evaluated. 213
 In addition to the traditional rational basis
and strict scrutiny standards, Justice Brennan included an intermediate stand-
ard of review. 216
 Under an intermediate standard, he stated, the Court in-
quires whether the classification could "fairly be viewed as furthering a sub-
stantial interest of the State."'" This intermediate test, Justice Brennan
asserted, was appropriately applied whenever a statute discriminated on the
basis of a classification not "facially invidious," but giving rise to "recurring
constitutional difficulties. " 218
 In order to determine which of the three stand-
ards was appropriate, Justice Brennan turned to an examination of the nature
of the class singled out, and of the right asserted. 219
In discussing the nature of the plaintiffs' class, Justice Brennan observed
that various governmental policies had created a situation in which undocu-
mented aliens constituted an "underclass" within our society. 22° Although the
presence of this underclass was tolerated, if not welcomed, undocumented
aliens were subject to the denial of benefits made available to citizens and law-
fully admitted aliens. 22 ' The Court also noted that undocumented alien
children were, as children, a special category of this underclass. 222
 The Court
compared the situation faced by undocumented children in Plyler to that faced
by children discriminated against on the basis of their illegitimacy. 223
  In both
situations, Justice Brennan noted, the children were being penalized because of
the conduct of their parents, over which they had no contro1. 224
 Whatever
justifications the state might have for withholding benefits from the parents, he
stated, they did not apply equally to the children. 223
 Consequently, the Court
" 2 Id. at 215.
213 Id,
214 Id. at 215-16.
" 8 Id. at 216-18.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 217-18. The Court cited Craig v. Boren and Lath v. Lalli as examples of cases in
which an intermediate standard of review was employed. Id. at 218 n.16. Both of those cases
employed a test which required that the classification be substantially related to an important
state objective. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 295 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
218
 457 U.S. at 217.
219 Id. at 218-23.




 Id. at 220.
27+ Id.
225 Id.
1384	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 !Vol, 24:1363
asserted, it was difficult to conceive of a rational basis for the statute."' Never-
theless, Justice Brennan in a footnote concluded that undocumented aliens,
and thus undocumented alien children, were not a suspect class. 227 In support
of his finding of non-suspectness, Justice Brennan pointed out that entry into
the class was a product of voluntary action."' Moreover, he reasoned, since
undocumented status was not irrelevant to permissible federal legislative goals
such as foreign policy and naturalization, undocumented status was not a
"constitutional irrelevancy."'"
The Court then wined to an examination of the right asserted. Justice
Brennan began his analysis by citing to San Antonio v. Rodriguez, which, he
stated, held that education was not a fundamental right under the Constitu-
tion. 23° This holding was not dispositive in Justice Brennan's view because
education was distinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation."'
Referring to cases from a number of areas of constitutional law which have rec-
ognized the importance of education to our society, 232 Justice Brennan asserted
that although education was not a fundamental right, it played a "fundamental
role" in maintaining society."' Education, he stated, is the primary vehicle for
transmitting societal values and for preparing citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in the American political system. 234
Having noted the general importance of education, Justice Brennan then
discussed the significant costs that a complete denial of education would impose
on society and the individual."' Justice Brennan observed that even though
non-citizens are limited in their ability to participate in our political system, the
role of education as preparation for political participation was still important."'
In support he noted that the lower courts had determined that many of the
plaintiff children would remain in the country permanently and eventually
become citizens. 237 Even for those who would not eventually become citizens,
"6 Id.
2" Id. at 219 n.19.
220 Id. Although Justice Brennan established that undocumented alien children were not
responsible for their status, he apparently did not treat the children as a separate class in deter-
mining whether the class was suspect,
229 id.
230
	 at 221. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
231 Id.
"2 Id. The Court cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating under the
due process clause a statute which prohibited the teaching of foreign languages before the eighth
grade); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating a statute requiring
Bible readings in schools as a violation of the establishment clause); Amback v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979) (sustaining against an equal protection challenge a state statute prohibiting cer-
tain aliens from teaching in public schools); and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(holding that a statute requiring Amish children to attend school beyond the eighth grade violated
the establishment clause).
"3 457 U.S. at 221.
21' Id.
235 Id. at 221-23.
236 Id. at 222 n.20.
237 Id.
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Justice Brennan asserted, education was important because of its role as a
transmitter of societal values, which helps to maintain social order and stabili-
ty. 238 Consequently, he asserted, the complete denial of education to a discrete
group of children imposed great costs on society. 239
In addition to the costs to society, Justice Brennan also noted the signifi-
cant costs a lack of education imposed on the individual. The illiteracy caused
by a lack of education, he stated, was an enduring disability, which limits a
child's advancement on the basis of merit. 240 The ultimate effect of such a dis-
ability, Justice Brennan asserted, would take an inestimable toll on the "social,
economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual .... 5,241
Justice Brennan concluded that strict scrutiny was not appropriate because the
statute affected neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right. 242 Neverthe-
less, he stated, because of the significant costs that the denial of a basic educa-
tion to a discrete group of children imposes on both society and the individual,
the Court would require that the Texas statute be shown to further a substan-
tial state interest if it was to be upheld."'
Once he had selected an intermediate standard of review, Justice Brennan
turned to the application of that standard to the facts of the case."' At the out-
set, Justice Brennan rejected the proposition that simply because Congress im-
plicitly created the undocumented status of the children, the state could ra-
tionally withhold benefits based on that status."' That Congress had not sanc-
tioned the children's presence within the United States, he stated, did not
necessarily mean that the state could discriminate against them. 248 Justice
Brennan noted that although the Court had previously held that a state could
regulate undocumented aliens when the regulation furthered both a federal
policy and legitimate state goals, 247 he concluded that no federal policy sup-
ported the denial of education benefits to undocumented children. 248
Justice Brennan then addressed the state objectives urged in support of the
statute. 249 The Justice summarily disposed of the state's argument that its
desire to preserve its limited resources was, without more, sufficient justifica-
238 Id.
239 Id. at 222.
248 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 223.
245 Id. at 222-24.
'" Id. at 224-230.
Id. at 224.
246 Id. at 224-226.
247 Id. In De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the Court held that a state law which
prohibited employers from hiring undocumented aliens was not preempted by the federal Im-
migration and Nationality Act. Id. at 365. The Court found that the state statute was a valid ex-
ercise of the state's power to regulate employment and that Congress had not evidenced an intent
to occupy the field. Id. at 356-58. The Court did not address whether the statute violated the
equal protection clause as none of the parties had standing to raise the issue.
248 457 U.S. at 226.
249 Id. at 227.
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tion for the classification. 250 He then turned to what he considered to be three
colorable state interests that might have supported the statute. 2"
Justice Brennan first addressed the state's interest in protecting itself from
the potentially harmful economic effects of an influx of undocumented
aliens. 252 He noted that the state had not presented evidence that undocu-
mented aliens had burdened the state's economy. 253 In fact, he stated, the dis-
trict court had found evidence that undocumented aliens contributed more to
the state's economy than they received in benefits. 254 Moreover, Justice Bren-
nan found that the dominant incentive for illegal immigration was the
availability of employment, not free public education. 255 Even if the state had
an interest in detering illegal immigration, he concluded, the denial of educa-
tional benefits was a "ludicrously" ineffective means to that end. 256
The second possible justification for the classification was that undocu-
mented aliens imposed special burdens on the state's education system."' Jus-
tice Brennan noted that the district court had determined that the exclusion of
undocumented children would do little to improve the quality of education in
the state. 258 Justice Brennan also noted that in terms of the burdens they im-
posed on the education system, undocumented children were "basically indis-
tinguishable" from legally resident alien children. 259 Finally, Justice Brennan
addressed the state's asserted interest in limiting its educational benefits to
children who would remain within the state."° Without determining whether
such an interest was legitimate, he concluded that there was no indication that
undocumented children were more likely than other children to leave the
state."'
Having thus concluded that no substantial state interest was furthered by
the state's classification, Justice Brennan held that Section 21.031 was un-
constitutional. 262
250 Id.





256 Id. at 228-29. The Court noted that the prohibition of employment of undocumented
aliens would probably be more effective. Id. The lower courts had noted that Texas had not
enacted such a statute, thus questioning the state's asserted exclusionary motive. .458 F. Supp.
569, 585 & n.21 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
457 U.S. at 229.
258 Id .
259 Id. Although the district court found that Mexican immigration had caused over-
crowding in the border school districts which was compounded by the poverty of the parents and
the special needs of the children, such as bilingual education, free lunches, and free clothing, the
court also noted that these characteristics were shared by both legally resident and undocumented
alien children. 458 F. Supp. 569, 589 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
260 457 U.S. at 229-30.
"' Id. at 230.
262 Id.
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B. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Marshall filed a brief concurring opinion asserting his belief that
education should be considered fundamenta1. 2" In support of his conclusion,
Justice Marshall drew upon his dissent in San Antonio v. Rodriguez. 264 As in
Rodriguez, Justice Marshall argued that "the unique status accorded public
education by our society," and the "close relationship between education and
some of our most basic constitutional values," demanded that education be
considered a fundamental right."' Justice Marshall also repeated his criticism
of the two-tiered approach to equal protection. 266
 He noted that the facts in
Plyler, in particular, demonstrated the wisdom of an approach which allows
varying levels of scrutiny. 267
Justices Powell and Blackmun also filed concurring opinions, each empha-
sizing a different aspect of the majority's analysis. Justice Blackmun asserted
that the nature of the interest at stake was crucial to the decision in the case. 268
He began his analysis by discussing both the fundamental rights aspect of equal
protection and the Rodriguez holding that education was not a fundamental
right. 259
 Blackmun asserted that when nonconstitutional rights were at stake,
even those involving the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings," no special treatment was warranted under the equal protection
clause."° Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun concluded that a classification result-
ing in a complete denial of education should trigger stricter standards of review
than the rational basis test."' The stricter standard was necessary, Justice
Blackmun reasoned, because an absolute deprivation of educational benefits,
as opposed to the relative deprivation confronting the Court in Rodriguez, 272
would create a "sub class of illiterate persons" who would be permanently and
insurmountably disadvantaged."' Because the majority had concluded that the
statute did not further a substantial state interest, Justice Blackmun reasoned
that it was not necessary to decide whether an even stricter standard might be
called for. 274
Justice Powell concurred separately in order to emphasize what he con-
sidered to be the crucial aspect of the case: the nature of the class of the children
263 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
264 Id.
263 Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 111 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
266
 457 U.S. at 231.
267 Id.
268 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
269 Id. at 231-32.
27° Id. at 232 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
271
 Id. at 234.
272 In Rodriguez, the Court emphasized that the challenged school financing scheme pro-
vided the plaintiff children with an opportunity to acquire basic minimal skills. 411 U.S. 1, 37
(1973). The Court, however, left open the question of whether a state could constitutionally
withhold all educational opportunities. Id. See generally Michelman, supra note 94, at 33-39.
2 " 457 U.S. at 234.
274 Id. at 235.
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affected by the statute. 275
 Drawing on decisions concerning illegitimacy
classifications, 276
 Justice Powell asserted that undocumented children should
not be discriminated against because they have been assigned a legal status
over which they had no contro1. 277
 The appropriate standard of review, he con-
cluded, was an intermediate one which would require that the state's interests
be substantial and that the classification bear a "fair and substantial relation"
to those interests.'"
Agreeing with the majority that the state's interests were poorly served by
the exclusion of undocumented children from public schools, he concluded that
the statute was unconstitutional. 279
 Justice Powell noted however, that his con-
clusion was restricted to a statute which excluded minor children who were not
responsible for their presence in the country. 28° He suggested that a different
case would be presented if the plaintiff class had included mature minors who
were responsible for their violation of the federal immigration laws. 28 '
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Con-
nor, filed a dissenting opinion. 282
 The dissent criticized the majority for depart-
ing from "principled constitutional adjudication" by adopting an "unabash-
edly result-oriented approach. "283
 It agreed with the majority's conclusion that
undocumented alien children were not a suspect class, and that education was
not a fundamental right.'" The dissent asserted, however, that the level of
scrutiny employed by the majority, was the result of a piecing together of
"quasi-fundamental-rights and quasi-suspect-class analysis," custom tailored
to the facts of the case. 285
 The dissent asserted, therefore, that once the Court
had determined that strict scrutiny was not appropriate, it should have limited
its inquiry to determining whether the classification bore a "rational relation-
ship to a legitimate state purpose."'"
According to the dissent, the majority's reliance on cases involving illegiti-
mates was misleading. 287
 Unlike illegitimates, the status of undocumented
27 ' Id. at 236 (Powell, J., concurring).
276
 See supra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
277 457 U.S. at 238.
278
 Id. at 239.
279 Id. at 239-40.
288 Id. at 240 n.5.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 242.
283 Id. at 244.
284 Id,
285 Id. Although the dissent cited Lalli v. Lalli to distinguish the plaintiff class from the
class of illegitimates, it did not discuss the standard of review which Lalli applied. Nor did the dis-
sent discuss any other case employing an intermediate standard of review.
"' Id. at 248.
287 Id. at 246.
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aliens is a result of Congress's obviously valid exercise of its broad constitu-
tional powers in the field of immigration and nationality. 288 The dissent noted
that the majority had not suggested that undocumented alien children, because
of their lack of culpability for their illegal status, could not be deported. 289
Because the relationship between the undocumented alien and the United
States was a federally prohibited one, the dissent concluded, there could be
"no presumption that a State has a constitutional duty to include illegal aliens
among the recipients of its governmental benefits." 29 ° The dissent further
stated that numerous federal welfare programs exclude undocumented aliens
from participation. 29 ' The opinion concluded, therefore, that it was rational for
the state to deduce that it did not have the same obligations toward people who
were not lawfully within the country as it had toward lawful residents. 292
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION IN PI, YLER
The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Plyler are all framed
in terms of the traditional, multi-tiered approach to equal protection analysis,
in which characterization of the challenged classification determines the
appropriate standard of review. There are indications in the majority opinion,
however, that Justice Brennan may be attempting to blur the distinctions be-
tween the various standards of review, and that he has, at least tacitly, adopted
a balancing approach to the resolution of equal protection cases. This section of
the casenote examines the analytical models employed in the Plyler opinions.
First the majority opinion in Plyler is discussed, focusing on Justice Brennan's
departure from the traditional model of equal protection analysis. 293 It is sub-
mitted that the majority opinion in fact undertakes a balancing of the com-
peting interests involved in the case. Then, different models of eqUal protection
balancing are set forth and analyzed, and a five factor model is proposed."'
The majority and concurring opinions are then examined in light of this pro-
posed model. 295 Finally, the merits of employing a balancing approach in equal
protection analysis are discussed, drawing in particular on Chief Justice
Burger's dissent in Plyler. 296
A. The Majority Opinion and Equal Protection Balancing
At first glance, Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Plyler v. Doe appears




291 Id. at 251.
292 Id. at 250-51.
293 See infra notes 297-307 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 308-322 and accompanying text.
285 See infra notes 326-34 and accompanying text.
296 See infra notes 235-342 and accompanying text.
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fled three possible standards under which the challenged classification might be
reviewed: the rational basis, strict scrutiny, and intermediate standards. 297 The
selection of the appropriate standard, Justice Brennan asserted, depended on
the nature of the class or the right affected. 298 Nevertheless, upon closer ex-
amination, it is apparent that Justice Brennan's reasoning departs in several
respects from the analysis traditionally applied by the Court. Ordinarily, in
determining the appropriate standard of review in equal protection cases, the
focus of the Court's analysis is on whether the class affected is "suspect" and
whether the right or benefit burdened is "fundamental." Justice Brennan,
however, summarily disposed of both contentions in the earliest part of his
analysis. Justice Brennan's discussion of the suspect class issue was relegated to
a textual statement noting that undocumented status is not immutable, 299 and
to a footnote which neither cited nor discussed any equal protection cases. 3°°
He also disposed of the fundamental rights issue with a perfunctory cite to San
Antonio v. Rodriguez. 30 ' In spite of the fact that a significant amount of equal pro-
tection analysis since the Warren Court era has focused on these issues, Justice
Brennan concluded that the identification of a class as suspect or a right as fun-
damental was an "abstract question. "302
There are other indications in Justice Brennan's opinion which suggest
that he was attempting to downplay the Court's traditional emphasis on rigid
categorizations of classes, rights, and standards of review. For example, Justice
Brennan identifies an intermediate level of scrutiny that requires the classifica-
tion to further "some substantial goal of the State. " 303 Ordinarily, under the
intermediate test, the Court has required that the statutory classification bear a
substantial relation to a substantial or important state interest. 304 In light of the
Court's history of using a precisely and consistently formulated test, Justice
Brennan's departure from the traditional wording is probably not inadvertent.
Although the substantial state interest test that he articulates might be
thought to be indicative of an intention to focus primarily on the importance of
the state's interest, and less on the relationship between the means and the
ends, an examination of his reasoning in Plyler indicates that this is not the
case. 305 In his discussion of the various interests asserted in support of the
Texas statute, Justice Brennan considered the relationship between the interest
297 457 U.S. at 216-18.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 220.
300 Id. at 219.
30 ' U. at 221.
302 Id. at 223.
303 Id. at 224.
304 See supra notes 146-165 and accompanying text.
302 Such an approach would be directly contrary to the intermediate level approach pro-
posed by Professor Gunther, which focused on the relationship between the means and the ends
but did not consider the relative importance of the interests asserted. See supra notes 187-190 and
accompanying text.
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and the classification employed, as well as the substantiality of the state's inter-
est. 306 Rejecting as a justification for the statute the state's interest in protecting
itself from an influx of illegal immigrants, he noted that the primary incentive
for such immigration is employment rather than education, and that charging
tuition was a "ludicrously ineffectual" means to achieve that objective."'
From this it does not appear that Justice Brennan intended to suggest a new,
less demanding intermediate scrutiny test. Rather, Justice Brennan's approach
can be seen as an effort to deemphasize the significance of the particular words
or standard selected. Moreover, it is submitted that the reasoning of the ma-
jority opinion in Plyler, best can be described as a weighing of the individual
and state interests, consistent with a balancing model of equal protection
analysis.
B. A Balancing Approach to Equal Protection Analysis
1. The Balancing Approach Defined
In 1970, in Dandridge v. Williams, Justice Marshall first asserted that the
Supreme Court had applied and should apply a balancing process in reviewing
equal protection challenges to legislative classifications.'" In Dandridge, the
Court upheld a state regulation which imposed a maximum on welfare benefits
regardless of the number of children in the family.'" The Court concluded that
the regulation was in the area of economics and social welfare and needed only
meet the demands of the rational basis test. 31 ° Justice Marshall, dissenting,
asserted that the 'limitation was grossly overinclusive and underinclusive in
terms of the purpose of the statute, and unless the state showed a persuasive
justification for the classification, the regulation was riot rational. 3 " The ma-
jority, he alleged, avoided any analysis of the statute in issue by focusing on the
"abstract dichotomy" between the two approaches to equal protection review
traditionally employed by the Court.'" Rather than focus on the a priori defini-
tion of a right, fundamental or otherwise, Justice Marshall asserted, concentra-
tion should be placed on three factors: (1) "the character of the classification in
question, [(2)] the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits they do not receive, and [(3)] the asserted
state interests in support of the classification." 313
 Since Dandridge, Justice Mar-
shall has consistently asserted that a balancing model most accurately explains
the analysis which the Court undertakes in its review of equal protection
challenges.'"
3" 457 U.S. at 228.
307 Id.
3°' 397 U.S. 471, 521 & n.15 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
309
 Id. at 486.
31° Id. at 484-85. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text,
31' Id. at 519-27.
312 Id.
3'3 Id. at 520-21.
S 14 See cases cited supra note 202.
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According to Justice Marshall's interpretation, when fundamental rights
or suspect classes are involved, the balancing approach is functionally equiva-
lent to strict scrutiny.'" Under such circumstances, the weight which would be
accorded the character of the class or the importance of the right would be such
that it could, in essence, only be balanced by the demonstration of a compelling
state interest.'" Similarly, classifications involving simple economic regulation
ordinarily would be balanced by a showing that the classification is rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose.'" According to Justice Marshall, the ad-
vantages of the balancing approach become apparent when the Court deals
with traditionally less protected rights and classes,''° such as education, 31 "
employment, 320 welfare benefits, 32 ' and old age. 322
Although Marshall consistently identifies three factors which the Court
considers in balancing equal protection claims, one commentator has per-
suasively argued that the Court's decisions in fact involve the balancing of four
factors; two on the individual's side and two on the government's."' In this
four-factor model, the Court considers (1) the nature of the personal interest
that is burdened and (2) the extent of the burden, on the individual's side; on
the government's side, the Court considers (3) the nature of the governmental
interest served by the statute at issue, and (4) the extent to which that interest is
served, i.e., the fit between the means and the end. 324 Marshall's balancing
test and the four-factor model overlap to a certain extent. Both consider the
nature of the personal interest affected and the importance of the governmental
interest served. Moreover, although Marshall refers only to the strength of the
state interest involved, his application of the balancing test in equal protection
cases demonstrates that he also considers the closeness of the means-ends fit in
weighing the state's interest, as does the four-factor model. For example, in
Dandridge, Marshall noted that "to the extent there is a legitimate state interest
in encouraging the heads of [welfare] households to find employment, applica-
tion of the maximum grant regulation is also grossly underinclusive because it
singles out and affects only large families." 325 Justice Marshall thus considers
the effectiveness of the means chosen by the state, as well as the importance of
the state's interest.
Justice Marshall's balancing test and the four-factor model differ in that
only Justice Marshall considers the nature of the class disadvantaged, while the
3" Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 319 n. 1.
"6 See id.
" 7 Id.
318 Id. at 319 n.l.
3 ' 9 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
320 Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321-27 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
322 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 321-27.
323 Note, supra note 188, at 869.
324 Id.
325 397 U.S. at 527 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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four-factor model considers the extent to which the individual's interest is
burdened. It is submitted that any attempt to explain the Court's past decisions
in terms of a balancing model must account for the elements of Marshall's
three-prong balancing test as well as those of the four-factor model. An accu-
rate balancing model should consider the nature of the class discriminated
against, since it is clear that certain classifications, such as those based on race,
can only be balanced by a compelling state interest, even when the individual's
interest is slight and the burden is not great. In addition, the model would con-
sider the extent to which the personal interest is burdened, because the Court
has upheld slight infringements on important personal interests. 326 This
casenote proposes therefore, a five-factor balancing model which encompasses
all the factors the Court has relied on in past equal protection decisions. The
five-factor model would weigh (1) the nature of the class burdened, (2) the im-
portance of the individual interest burdened, and (3) the extent to which the in-
terest is burdened, against (4) the importance of the governmental interest
asserted and (5) the fit between the means selected and the ends sought.
2. The Balancing Approach Applied
The functioning of the proposed five-factor balancing model can be illus-
trated by examining two equal protection cases whose results are difficult to re-
concile under traditional equal protection theories. Trimble v. Gordon"' and
Lalli v. LaI1i328 both involved equal protection challenges to state statutes that
limited the ability of illegitimates to inherit by intestate succession from their
fathers' estates. 329 In Trimble, the state required that illegitimate children seek-
ing to claim under their fathers' estates have been legitimated by the intermar-
riage of their parents. Similarly, in Lalli, the state required that illegitimates
who claimed under fathers' estates have had the father's paternity decided in a
judicial proceeding prior to the father's death. Although the statutes were
similar, the Court struck down the statute in Trimble while it upheld the statute
in Lalli. When analyzed in terms of the balancing model however, the results in
the two cases are not inconsistent. In both statutes, the nature of the class
discriminated against — illegitimates; the importance of the state's interest —
assuring the orderly disposition of estates; and the importance of the in-
dividual's interest — the right to inherit, were identical. In Lalli, however, the
challenged statute placed less of a burden on illegitimates claiming under their
fathers' estates than did the statute in Trimble. While an illegitimate can seek a
judicial determination of paternity, he or she cannot affect the marriage of his
or her parents. Moreover, the statute in Lalli, because it excluded fewer il-
legitimate children who could otherwise present a claim without jeopardizing
326 See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 762 (1972).
327
 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
328 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
329 See supra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
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the orderly administration of estates, was more closely related to the state's in-
terest than the statute in Trimble. The lessening of the burden imposed on the
class in Lalli, combined with the closer fit between statutory means and ends,
could be seen as sufficient to shift the equal protection balance in favor of the
state.
C. Plyler as a Balancing Decision
The five-factor balancing test can be further illustrated with the majority
opinion of Plyler. Although Justice Brennan framed the issues presented in
Plyler in terms of a three-tiered model, his analysis can be seen as tacitly follow-
ing the five-factor balancing test. Justice Brennan began by discussing the
nature of the class, noting its underclass status."° He pointed out that the
Texas statute was directed at a special sub-class of undocumented children,
who were not responsible for their legal status."' He then addressed the impor-
tance of the governmental benefit withheld. He noted that the Court had con-
sistently recognized the importance of education in our society. 332 This impor-
tance, he stated, was not significantly lessened by the fact that the children in-
volved were not citizens. 333 He then discussed the high cost of a denial of
education for both the individual and society. 334 Having thus examined the
nature of the class and the importance of the right or benefit withheld, he con-
cluded that, to justify the statute, the state would have to show that its interests
were substantial."' He then considered the interests asserted in support of the
statute. He noted that the state's interest in preserving its resources, standing
alone, was not substantial enough to justify the classification. 335 He then con-
sidered the interests asserted by the state in support of the statute, addressing
both the substantiality of the state's interest and the relationship between the
interest and the classification."' He concluded that the asserted justifications
were insufficient to uphold the classification, in light of the substantial costs im-
posed by the statute.'"
Despite Justice Brennan's apparent tacit acceptance of a balancing ap-
proach, the concurring and dissenting opinions demonstrate that a majority of
the Court continues to apply a more traditional two or three-tiered analysis.
Although Justices Powell and Blackmun both joined the Court's opinion as
well as its judgement, their rationales differed considerably from Justice Bren-
nan's. Justice Brennan's discussion of the nature of the class of undocumented
alien children and the importance of the educational benefits withheld was
330
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directed at determining how significant a state interest would be required to
shift the equal protection balance in favor of the state. Justices Powell and
Blackmun, however, emphasized that the crucial issue was the characterization
or categorization of the right and class affected, from which the appropriate
standard could be determined. Justice Powell noted that he considered the
nature of the class of undocumented children to be essential to the proper
resolution of the case. Relying on the Court's decisions concerning illegitimacy
classifications, Justice Powell concluded that because the children were not
responsible for their status, they could not be discriminated against without a
showing that the classification was substantially related to a substantial state
interest. Justice Blackmun stated that he found the nature of the right to be
crucial to the proper resolution of the case. Moreover, Justice Blackmun's
opinion contains suggestions that he continues to find a two-tiered approach to
equal protection appropriate. Consequently, although he differs with the dis-
sent on the proper characterization of the denial of a right to education, he ap-
pears to accept a similar model of equal protection analysis.
D. An Assessment of Equal Protection Balancing
The situation before the Court in Plyler v. Doe illustrates the inadequacy of
the traditional two-tiered model of equal protection. The class of undocu-
mented alien children, and the right to a basic minimum of education, are not
easily characterized in terms of either the rational basis or strict scrutiny tests.
Although there are few restrictions on Congress's ability to regulate aliens,
both those who have entered the country lawfully as well as those who are here
unlawfully, the states have no similar broad power. Yet under traditional equal
protection analysis, the nature of the class itself would determine the standard
to which the statute will be subjected. Thus, deference to federal regulations
cannot easily be reconciled with heightened scrutiny of state regulations. An in-
termediate standard of review which employs a balancing process is flexible
enough, however, to account for the differences between federal and state in-
terests.
The very flexibility that a balancing approach provides also gives rise to
an unpredictability in equal protection law. A balancing approach necessitates
more of a case-by-case approach to equal protection analysis than is required
when categories are narrowly defined and outcomes readily predicted. The
analysis is in many ways subjective; courts and individual judges will disagree
how much weight should be accorded governmental and individual interests,
and how much precision should be required in different statutory schemes."
Despite the subjectivity and unpredictability of balancing, however, it is still to
be preferred to the traditional two-tiered approach. Balancing can at least take
into account the wide range of individual interests implicated by the equal pro-
tection clause without completely tying the hands of government.
939 See generally Note, supra note 188, at 869-91.
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Chief justice Burger, dissenting in Plyler,
 , asserted that the majority opin-
ion would stand for little outside the facts of the particular cases. "In the end,"
he stated, "we are told little more than that the level of scrutiny employed to
strike down the Texas law applies only when illegal alien children are deprived
of a public education. "S 40
 He noted that the majority implied that the equal
protection clause would not require that the state provide welfare benefits to il-
legal aliens.'" Although this is perhaps the very type of flexibility that is
desirable in equal protection analysis, the Chief justice appears to object to the
lack of clearly identifiable standards that is inherent in a balancing approach.
Although there is an inherent danger that a balancing approach will result
in ad hoc decisions, balancing need not be unprincipled. 342
 A balancing process
could result in "a body of standards applicable to different legislative subjects,
personal interests, and classificatory traits."'" Similar balancing processes are
employed by the Court in reviewing challenges to legislative actions under the
first amendment and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.'" The discomfort of many with a balancing approach in the equal pro-
tection context arises from the fact that equal protection values, in contrast to
those of the first amendment, are not clearly defined in the Constitution. Op-
ponents of a more active judicial approach to equal protection analysis argue
that when the Court balances competing interests, it is usurping the legislative
function. 345
 Legislative policymaking, they argue, involves the very weighing
that a balancing process entails, and courts would simply substitute their opin-
ions as to the appropriate balance for those of the legislature.'" Inherent in the
principle of judicial review of legislative decisions, however, is recognition that
the Constitution may require more or less than the political process will supply.
By adopting a balancing approach in equal protection cases, the Court merely
undertakes to perform its own function in a manner that most fully and honest-
ly supports the principles of the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Despite the apparent balancing of interests undertaken by the majority in
Plyter, , the Court continues to adhere at least outwardly to the tiered model of
equal protection analysis that evolved under the Warren Court. Whether or
not it is considered desirable, however, a balancing model more accurately
describes the analysis undertaken by the Court on equal protection cases. As
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long as the Court continues to obscure its true analysis with the terminology of
the Warren Court, the focus of debate will remain on the "abstract questions"
of whether a classification is "suspect," or a right is "fundamental." A more
forthright presentation of the majority's analysis would allow the dialogue
among the different factions on the Court and legal commentators to con-
tribute to the development of a consistent and comprehensible equal protection
doctrine.
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